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This paper studies the relative pricing of euro area sovereign CDS and the underlying government bonds. Our 
June 2010. We first compare the determinants of CDS spreads and bond spreads and test how the crisis has 
affected market pricing. Then we analyse the ‘basis’ between CDS spreads and bond spreads and which factors 
drive pricing differences between the two markets. Our first main finding is that the recent repricing of 
sovereign credit risk in the CDS market seems mostly due to common factors. Second, since September 2008, 
CDS spreads have on average exceeded bond spreads, which may have been due to ‘flight to liquidity’ effects 
and limits to arbitrage. Third, since September 2008, market integration for bonds and CDS varies across 
countries: In half of the sample countries, price discovery takes place in the CDS market and in the other half, 
price discovery is observed in the bond market. 
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sample comprises weekly CDS and bond spreads of ten euro area countries for the period from January 2006 to 




occurs and the protection component is triggered. Hence, a CDS contract serves to transfer the risk that a 
certain individual entity experiences a credit event from the “protection buyer” to the “protection seller” 
in exchange for the payment of a regular fee.  
Since late September 2008, the sovereign CDS market has attracted considerable attention. Recent market 
developments peaked in an unprecedented ‘flight to safety’ episode in early May 2010 in the euro area, 
when investors started large scale sell-offs of a variety of risky assets. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the euro area sovereign CDS market. 
Our sample comprises weekly observations on the CDS spreads and bond yields of ten euro area 
countries from January 2006 to June 2010. Although market information indicates growing volumes and 
active trading, potentially variable liquidity is certainly a major caveat in any analysis of market prices.  
Our first main contribution is a comparative analysis of the determinants of spreads on CDS and the 
underlying government bonds. Our approach allows us to use a comprehensive set of potential 
explanatory factors such as liquidity factors or proxies for risk aversion without being constrained by the 
specification of a particular pricing model. We find that the recent repricing of sovereign debt is strongly 
linked to common factors some of which proxy for changes in investor risk appetite.  
Due to sizeable risk premia in CDS quotes changes in credit and non-credit-related components lead to 
different interpretations of market expectations. Specifically, decreasing appetite for credit-risky 
instruments is a different signal of market perceptions than rising expectations about future defaults in the 
underlying instruments. Hence, high CDS premia during the crisis may be in part due to declining risk 
appetite and falling market liquidity, but also to concerns about an increasing number of credit rating 
downgrades, rather than to principal losses on outstanding debt. 
Our second main contribution is to study the ‘basis’, i.e. the difference between CDS spreads and the 
spreads on the underlying government bonds. In essence, both sovereign CDS and government bonds 
offer exposure to sovereign debt. Hence, the basis, which should normally be close to zero, can provide 
some insights into the functioning of sovereign credit markets. We find that for most countries in our 
sample the spread on the government bond relative to the swap rate is below the corresponding CDS 
spread. Our econometric analysis as well as the related literature allow us offer some potential 
explanations for this empirical observation. In particular, a number of authors have recently provided 
evidence for the existence of limits of arbitrage s and slow moving capital. They argue that deviations 
from the arbitrage-free parity do not seem to be easily exploitable as market frictions and structural 
changes throughout the crisis inhibit traders to arbitrage away these price differentials. 
Credit default swaps (CDS) offer trading for a wide range of instruments with exposure to credit risk.   
CDS provide traded insurance against credit risk. In a standard CDS contract, two parties enter into   
an agreement terminating either at the stated maturity or earlier when a previously specified credit event 
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1. Introduction 
Since August 2007, credit markets have witnessed an unprecedented repricing of credit risk. This credit 
market crisis has proceeded in several stages and has affected all sectors. The revaluation started in US 
mortgage markets; subsequently corporates, in particular banks, underwent a dramatic reassessment of 
their credit risk. This financial market turbulence reached a peak in the wake of the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008. After this event, many major banks on both sides of the Atlantic were in 
major distress and massive state intervention was required in order to mitigate systemic risk and its 
adverse macroeconomic consequences. 
Since September 2008, the sovereign debt market has attracted considerable attention. Before the crisis, 
trading in credit markets was concentrated on private sector instruments such as corporate credit risk or 
securitisation instruments. The collapse of Lehman Brothers in fall 2008 led to a fundamental 
reassessment of the default risk of developed country sovereigns. Widespread and large-scale state 
support for banks as well as other stimulus measures to the broader economy quickly increased public 
sector deficits to levels last seen after World War II. For example, in the UK the fiscal burden of 
extensive bank support measures is estimated at 44% of UK GDP (Panetta et al, 2009).  
In the euro area, sovereign debt markets in several countries came under unprecedented stress in the first 
half of 2010. Massive sell-offs were observed for instance in Greek government bonds, with CDS spreads 
on Greek bonds jumping above 1,000 basis points. These tensions peaked in a ‘flight to safety’ episode in 
early May 2010, when investors started large scale sell-offs of risky assets. European public authorities 
then announced a number of measures to reduce distress in financial markets. In particular, EU finance 
ministers launched the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), while the ECB announced several 
policy measures such as interventions in bond markets under the Securities Markets Programme. The 
EFSF with a planned overall volume up to EUR 440 billion is intended to support euro area governments 
which face difficulties in accessing public debt markets (cf. Deutsche Bank, 2010). These measures all 
helped improving sentiment in euro area sovereign debt markets. 
Traditionally, valuation of government debt issued by developed country sovereigns has treated default as 
a very low probability event.
3 Hence, modelling (e.g. in term structure analysis) is typically oriented 
towards interest rate risk or liquidity risk, rather than default risk. The absence of defaults among 
developed country governments has underpinned the widely used assumption that government bonds 
provide a good proxy for the long-horizon (default-) risk-free rate. Hence, before the crisis, the CDS 
market for developed country borrowers developed rather as a sideshow to the trading of emerging 
market debt. In addition to the perception of very low default risk in Western sovereigns, the dramatic 
experience of the 1997-1998 crisis in emerging market sovereigns also played a large role. Given this 
market focus, key papers on sovereign CDS such as Pan and Singleton (2008) or Longstaff et al. (2008) 
                                                      
3 In the literature on credit risk modelling, default risk is usually defined as the narrow risk arising from an entity’s failure to pay 
its obligations when they are due. In contrast, credit risk also covers any losses due to an entity’s credit rating being 
downgraded (e.g. from A to BBB). 
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do not study euro area countries.
4 Only in the context of the worsening of the current crisis has attention 
turned to default risk in euro area sovereign debt. Both for trading as well as for hedging reasons, market 
activity in euro area sovereign CDS has grown strongly. These recent concerns about default risk in 
developed country government bonds have therefore also cast doubts on using government bonds for 
estimating risk-free rates, a core feature of asset pricing. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the Euro area sovereign CDS market 
by making use of information from the underlying bonds. Our two main contributions are first a 
comparative analysis of the determinants of spreads
5 and second a study of the arbitrage relationship 
between CDS and the underlying bonds. In the first part, we study the common factors in the first 
differences of bond spreads and CDS spreads and analyse the impact of the repricing of credit risk on 
spreads. Our approach allows us to use a comprehensive set of potential explanatory factors such as 
liquidity factors or proxies for risk aversion without being constrained by the specification of a particular 
pricing model. In the second part of our paper we analyse the ‘basis’, i.e. the difference between CDS 
spreads and the spreads on the underlying government bonds. This variable is of particular interest 
because arbitrage trading should generally drive it close to zero. Hence, analysis of the determinants of 
the basis can help us understand market functioning as well as information transmission across the two 
markets which trade the same type of risk, namely sovereign credit risk. We also conduct a variety of 
robustness tests and discuss the economic significance of our results. 
Our sample comprises weekly observations on the CDS spreads and bond yields of ten Euro area 
countries. The sample period is from January 2006 to June 2010. Our analysis of the ‘basis’ complements 
the existing literature on sovereign CDS of developed countries as previous research on sovereign CDS 
has not studied the interaction with the underlying bonds. In particular, information from the underlying 
bond market significantly extends the information set for explaining CDS market pricing. Dieckmann and 
Plank (2010) study the pricing of sovereign CDS with a focus on the ‘private-public risk transfer’, i.e. 
how sovereign CDS are related to the respective country’s banking system. This question is also analysed 
by Ejsing and Lemke (2010) who document linkages between CDS of Euro area banks and their 
governments’ CDS. 
6 
Our first main finding is that the recent repricing of the cost of sovereign debt is strongly linked to 
common factors some of which proxy for changes in investor risk appetite. As regards the impact of the 
crisis, we find a structural break in market pricing which coincides with the sharp increase in trading of 
sovereign CDS. Furthermore declining risk appetite, which has characterised investor behaviour since 
summer 2007, has provided a sizable contribution to the observed strong increase in CDS premia.  
                                                      
4 Pan and Singleton (2008) study Korea, Turkey and Mexico. Longstaff et al. (2008) analyse 26 countries where the only EU 
countries are Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.  
5 Following the literature on credit markets, we use the terms ’credit spread’ and ’CDS premium‘ as synonyms because a CDS 
premium can be interpreted as the spreads between a corporate bond and the default- risk free-rate (Duffie, 1999). 
6 The analysis of euro area sovereign bond markets has typically focused on the role of fiscal fundamentals, market liquidity or 
market integration (cf. Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2009). Overall, this literature looks more at migration risk (i.e. rating 
downgrades) than on the risk of outright default. Euro area bond market developments in the crisis are analysed by Sgherri 
and Zoli (2009), Mody (2009) or Haugh et al. (2009). 
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Second, the nature of the relation between CDS and government bonds indicates that interdependence 
between the two markets differs from the patterns observed for corporate debt markets. Typically, the 
basis in corporate debt markets has been below zero since the start of the crisis (Fontana, 2010). In 
contrast, we observe a positive basis for most countries. One possible explanation for the CDS spread 
exceeding the bond spread are ‘flight to liquidity’ effects
7, which specifically lower government bond 
spreads in periods of market distress. The main exceptions to this pattern are Portugal, Ireland and Greece 
where we find a temporary negative basis in 2009 and early 2010. Since September 2008, market 
integration for bonds and CDS differs across countries. In half of the sample countries, price discovery 
takes place in the CDS market and in the other half, price discovery is observed in the bond market. In 
contrast, before the crisis, there was only limited trading activity in the CDS market which also affected 
price discovery and the linkages between the bond and the derivative market.  
Overall, our results on the arbitrage relationship between bonds and CDS support the existence of ‘limits 
of arbitrage’ (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) during the most turbulent periods of the financial crisis from late 
2008 onwards and also in spring 2010. Pricing in the CDS market and the government bond market may 
have drifted apart because of ‘flight to liquidity’ effects in the latter and because of increasing hurdles for 
those traders who were trying to exploit what seemed to be sizable arbitrage opportunities. For instance, 
the number of market participants who acted as arbitrage traders declined sharply due to decreasing risk 
appetite and the exit of several major institutions such as Lehman. Overall, the crisis has had an adverse 
impact on both market and funding liquidity. Similar evidence of limits of arbitrage has been reported by 
Bhanot and Guo (2010) and Fontana (2010) for the basis between corporate bond spreads and the 
corresponding CDS during the crisis. In general, many market segments also witnessed the breakdown of 
what used to be stable relative pricing relationships before the crisis (cf. Mitchell and Pulvino, 2010 or 
Krishnamurty, 2010). 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we discuss the mechanism of sovereign CDS 
and the sample. Section 3 describes the results of the econometric analysis. Section 4 concludes the paper 
by summarising the main results. 
2. Sample
2.1 A brief review of sovereign CDS 
A CDS serves to transfer the risk that a certain individual entity or credit defaults from the “protection 
buyer” to the “protection seller” in exchange for the payment of a regular fee. In case of default, the buyer 
is fully compensated by receiving e.g. the difference between the notional amount of the loan and its 
recovery value from the protection seller. Hence, the protection buyer‘s exposure is identical to that of 
short-selling the underlying bond and hedging out the interest-rate risk. Commonly, CDS transactions on 
sovereign entities have a contractual maturity of one to ten years.  
                                                      
7 Beber et al. (2009) illustrate ‘flight to liquidity’ effects in euro area government bonds. 
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The CDS spread is the insurance premium (in basis points per annum as a fraction of the underlying 
notional) for protection against default. As in a standard interest rate swap the premium is set such that 
the CDS has a value of zero at the time of origination. If a credit event occurs the protection seller 
compensates the protection buyer for the incurred loss by either paying the face value of the bond in 
exchange for the defaulted bond (physical settlement) or by paying the difference between the post-
default market value of the bond and the par value (cash settlement) where the post-default value of the 
bond is fixed by an auction procedure. In the context of sovereign risk, the first such auction procedure 
was held for Ecuador in January 2009. 
In a standard CDS contract on public or corporate debt, two parties enter into an agreement terminating 
either at the stated maturity or earlier when a previously specified “credit event” occurs and the 
protection component is triggered. Three important credit events defined (along with other terms of the 
contract) by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (Barclays, 2010a) are:  
x Failure to pay principal or coupon when they are due: Hence, already the failure to pay a coupon 
might represent a credit event, albeit most likely one with a high recovery (i.e. ‘technical 
default’). 
x Restructuring: The range of admissible events depends on the currency and the precise terms 
which materialise. 
x Repudiation / moratorium. 
For corporate as well as sovereign CDS, the premium can be interpreted as a credit spread on a bond 
issued by the underlying reference entity.
8 By means of a no-arbitrage argument, Duffie (1999) shows 
that the CDS spread should equal the spread over LIBOR on a par floating rate bond. According to this 
pricing analysis, the risk-reward profile of a protection seller (who is ‘long’ credit risk) therefore is very 
similar to a trading strategy which combines a bond by the same entity with a short position in a default-
risk-free instrument. As will be discussed later in more detail, this theoretical equivalence allows traders 
to arbitrage potential price differences between an entity’s bonds and its CDS. 
Like most CDS contracts, sovereign CDS typically serve as trading instruments rather than pure insurance 
instruments. Investors commonly use sovereign CDS mainly for the following purposes: 
x Taking an outright position on spreads depending on traders’ expectations over a short horizon  
x Hedging macro, i.e. country risk (e.g. a bank’s exposure to a quasi-governmental body) 
x Relative-value trading (e.g. a short position in country X and a long position in country Y) 
x Arbitrage trading (e.g. government bonds vs. CDS).  
In addition to country default risk, a number of additional factors may influence the information content 
of CDS premia. First, in relative terms, sovereign CDS volume is small. As a measure, chart 1 uses the 
                                                      
8 Since May 2009, CDS trading has undergone a ‘big bang’ with prices now consisting of an upfront payment and a regular fixed 
coupon (cf. Barclays 2010a). This change in their contractual features has made trading and closing out of positions easier. 
Putting the two components together leads to the CDS premium which is comparable to the previous contracts. In many 
cases, CDS positions are collateralised with the margin providing initial protection and also a variation component. 
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publicly available DTCC data for two snapshots relative to the volume of total bonds outstanding. For 
Portugal and Ireland around 7%. This magnitude is in contrast to other sovereign derivatives market, such 
as the Bund future, where the derivatives market exceeds the cash market. For the Bund futures market, 
Upper and Werner (2002) show that in periods of high volatility price discovery takes place in the 
derivatives market rather than the cash market. Second, liquidity in CDS markets overall is also quite 
heterogeneous. The most liquid instruments are index products where bid-ask spreads amount to less than 
one basis point and intraday pricing is available. In contrast, prices for some single-name CDS contracts 
with bid-ask spreads in the double-digit range are quite stale.
9 Third, sovereign CDS on e.g. euro 
governments are typically denominated in US$ (Barclays, 2010 a). One reason for choosing a different 
currency than the bond’s original denomination is that this allows investors to avoid the risk of a severe 
depreciation of the bond’s currency in case of a credit event. This currency mismatch introduces an 
element of exchange rate risk into the pricing of the contract. Finally, counterparty risk may matter far 
more for sovereign CDS than for corporate CDS. In particular, CDS on major countries may not always 
provide  genuinely  robust  insurance  against  a  large-scale  default  given the close linkages between  
sovereigns and the financial sector.  
2.2 Sample details
We use weekly CDS spreads and benchmark bond yields collected from Bloomberg. Our sample period is 
1 January 2006 to 28 June 2010. The series are for 10-year CDS denominated in US$ for Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. This country 
selection is due to data availability. We focus on the ten-year horizon as this is the common horizon for 
the government bond. Hence, our yield data cover benchmark bonds with a ten-year maturity.  
For all countries, we calculate the bond spread relative to the ten-year swap rate because interest rate 
swaps are commonly seen as the market participants’ preferred measure of the risk-free rate (cf. Beber et 
al., 2009). In addition, this approach guarantees a homogeneous benchmark across the euro area. Some 
papers such as Haugh et al. (2009) use the German benchmark Bund yield as a proxy for the risk-free 
rate. However, this approach has the disadvantage that the CDS on Germany has to be omitted from the 
analysis. Furthermore, the benchmark role of Bunds may lead to the existence of a significant 
‘convenience yield‘.
10  
We start the description of our sample by taking an aggregated perspective on the repricing. Chart 2 
shows the developments in European sovereign CDS (iTraxx SovX Western Europe index) and those for 
                                                      
9 For the corporate market, Blanco et al (2005) show that the CDS market already in its early stage provided the benchmark for 
the market pricing of default risk whereas the bond market played a minor role. A key factor is that CDS contracts are 
standardised with a maturity of five or ten years whereas the usually high number of individual bonds shows potentially 
idiosyncratic components (e.g. callability, maturity or coupon). In particular, many bond investors have a hold to maturity 
perspective and hence do not contribute to market liquidity. 
10 For US Treasuries, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2009) estimate the ‘convenience yield‘ at 72 BP. 
Greece, the net open CDS amount to around 3% of their outstanding sovereign debt and for 
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European financials (iTraxx Main Investment Grade Financials index).
11 The chart illustrates the massive 
repricing of risk reaching its first peak in fall and winter 2008/2009 when the SovX index climbed above 
150 BP (see also Ejsing and Lemke, 2010 or Dieckmann and Plank, 2010). Both financial as well as 
sovereign CDS rose dramatically from October 2008 to early 2009 with the more recent market 
developments in sovereign markets since November 2009 providing a relatively smaller repricing in the 
index. Before the crisis, CDS for both types of entities were trading in the range of single-digit basis 
points with low volatility and also low market activity.  
Using a simple pricing model,
12 the implied, i.e. risk-neutral probability of default can be extracted from 
CDS premia. An application of this model to the most recent observations of the SovX index in chart 2 
leads to an estimate of the subjective default probability of around 1.3%. This market-implied estimate by 
far exceeds the historical estimate as for instance the long-run default probability of an A-rated issuer is 
around 0.1%. Such sizable differences have been observed by a number of papers in the context of the 
“credit spread puzzle” (Amato and Remolona, 2003). According to this stylised fact, expected default 
losses frequently account for a very small fraction of credit spreads. The residual component is 
interpreted as a risk premium (Giesecke et al., 2010), which is frequently found to be related to market 
liquidity or measures of investor risk appetite.  
Overall, given the definition of default events outlined above, this high level of the implied default 
probability for European sovereigns may be due to risk premia but also due to rising probabilities of a 
scenario of “technical default” rather than market concerns about principal losses on outstanding debt in a 
Lehman-type scenario. In addition, market concerns about migration risk (i.e. the risk of a sovereign 
suffering a credit rating downgrade), in particular the loss of the coveted AAA rating might also have 
contributed to the jumps.  
From a valuation perspective, both financial and sovereign credit instruments share strong exposure to 
systematic risk, i.e. a major deterioration in the macroeconomic environment, which in the case of 
financials would cause large-scale defaults in their loan books. Such a scenario of extremely high losses 
resembles the market’s reassessment of the risk-return relation in asset-backed securities from summer 
2007 onwards. Indeed, Berndt and Obreja (2010) show that European corporate CDS are significantly 
related to a factor which captures what the authors call “economic catastrophe risk”.  
Chart 3 plots the time series of bond spreads and CDS spreads for the ten countries in our sample. The 
descriptive statistics are shown in tables 1 and 2. Given the pronounced changes in CDS spreads after 
Lehman’s default we report descriptive statistics for two subsamples, 1 January 2006 to 12 September 
2008 (‘period I’) and 15 September 2008 to 28 June 2010 (‘period II’). 
13 
                                                      
11 The iTraxx Financials comprises 25 major European banks and insurance firms. The iTraxx SOVX comprises 15 Western 
European sovereigns (including e.g. the UK). The index started trading in September 2009, but historical data have been 
backfilled starting from 2004. 
12 This standard model can be written as CDS Premium = (1í LGD)*PD, where loss given default is commonly assumed to be 
60% and PD is the risk-neutral default probability (cf. Hull et al., 2005). 
13 A caveat in this analysis is that the statistics in table 1 in the first sub-period are also influenced by the low market activity in 
the sovereign CDS market. 
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The country-level plots in chart 3 confirm the massive repricing of credit risk with sample highs mostly 
reached in spring 2010. For example, the French CDS moved from a level below 3 basis points (BP) in 
June 2007 to a peak of 100 BP in June 2010. The Greek CDS spread records a first peak in late 2008 / 
early 2009. However, the second peak in 2010 by far exceeds the first peak as the CDS spread briefly 
surpassed 1000 BP, i.e. 10 percentage points. The same developments of two consecutive peaks within 
less than a year are also observed for Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. For all other 
EU countries in the sample, the first peak in late 2008 and early 2009 provides the sample high. 
14 In the 
first part of the sample, almost all sovereigns’ bonds traded below the swap curve as only Greece 
recorded a mean positive spread. In contrast, in the second part of the sample, mean negative spreads are 
only observed for Germany and France. 
Until the end of June 2010 euro area sovereign CDS spreads have not returned to the levels witnessed 
before the collapse of Lehman in September 2008. Given that our sample ends at the end of June 2010, 
data availability precludes us from analysing the impact of the SMP and the EFSF on CDS spreads or 
bond spreads. In the aftermath of Lehman’s collapse, the highest average CDS spreads are observed for 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal, where the mean premium exceeds 100 BP. We find that 
volatility is also highest for these five countries. The overall lowest premium is recorded for Germany 
with values of below one BP (0.70 BP) in the period before Lehman and 12 BP in the period after 
Lehman. In addition, the table also illustrates the sharp increase in volatility in the second period.  
The charts illustrate differences between the movements of bond spreads relative to the swap rate and 
CDS spreads (we will conduct further analysis of the difference between the two variables in the next 
subsection). Typically, the CDS spread is situated above the bond spread, i.e. in price terms bonds are 
more expensive than CDS. Before the outbreak of the financial crisis, variation in CDS spreads was low 
whereas bond spreads showed higher volatility. The comparatively low variability in CDS spreads also 
indicates that trading activity was lower. In the second part of the sample period there is also comovement 
between the two variables. The plots for Germany also provide evidence of the “flight to liquidity” effect. 
At the height of the financial crisis in late 2008, the CDS spread jumped to levels above 90 BP in part 
also due to fiscal concerns. At the same time, the Bund yield fell sharply to 75 basis points below the ten-
year euro swap rate. Such a portfolio shift into government bonds has been observed in many episodes of 
market turmoil such as for example the LTCM collapse in October 1998. The typical portfolio adjustment 
process is that investors sell assets perceived as risky and move into liquid government bonds which are 
perceived to offer a ‘safe-haven’ status (cf. Hartmann et al, 2004). This strong demand for safe - haven 
assets drove bond prices up and hence yields declined. This investor strategy is also supported by the 
mechanics of the Basel II capital requirements where the standardised approach allocates a risk weight of 
zero to government debt with a rating above A+ (BCBS, 2006).  
                                                      
14 At several points in time during 2010 a few countries have experienced an inversion of their credit curve (cf. Barclays, 2010 b). 
This means that the CDS premium for the short horizon, e.g. one or three years exceeds the premia for a maturity of five or 
ten years. Such a situation is very rare and has only been observed for high-yield corporates with a high perceived likelihood 
of imminent default. 
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In order to understand market pricing market liquidity is a key variable . To estimate a proxy for this 
variable, we make use of the approach proposed by Lesmond et al. (2007). This method has the advantage 
that estimation only requires a sample of daily data. In essence, low market liquidity is indicated by the 
fact that the price of an instrument does not change often, hence, we use the number of days per week 
with unchanged CDS spreads or bond prices as the basis for our proxy. 
Chart 4 shows the weekly cross-country averages of the number of zero changes in CDS premia and bond 
prices. Two observations are notable. First, the series indicates increasing CDS market liquidity with 
considerable spikes at year-end. Second, liquidity in the bond market seems to be higher than in the CDS 
market as there are far fewer instances of unchanged prices. 
2.3 The concept of the ‘basis’ between CDS and bonds 
In general, both sovereign CDS and government bonds offer investors exposure to the risk and return of 
sovereign debt. The basis is defined as the CDS spread minus the credit spread on a fixed-rate bond of 
similar maturity. In a basis trade, investors set up a default-risk free position by combining a bond 
position with a CDS trade in order to directly profit from potential price differences. With unimpeded 
access to sufficient funding (e.g. lending from prime brokers) arbitrage should over time reduce any 
differentials between the two market segments. Hence, differences between the market prices of bonds 
and CDS can provide information on the potential existence and size of arbitrage opportunities which 
should typically be very small if credit markets are functioning normally (cf. JP Morgan, 2009). 
15 
To exploit a negative basis an arbitrage trader has to finance the purchase of the underlying bond and buy 
protection in the CDS market. In this case, default risk arising from the underlying entity is fully removed 
from the resulting position. For a positive basis a trader short-sells the underlying bond and sells CDS 
protection. Hence, if the bond is cheaper than the CDS, the investor should buy the bond and buy CDS 
protection to “lock in” a risk-free profit and vice versa. These two cases are summarised in the following 
table: 
  CDS > Bond Spread 
(‘positive Basis’) 
CDS < Bond Spread 
(‘negative Basis’) 
Strategy  Sell CDS protection and bond  Buy CDS protection and bond 
Observed for  Most sovereigns  Corporates since crisis 
Empirical analysis on the basis during the crisis so far only covers corporate bonds. Fontana (2010) and 
Barot and Guo (2010) show that after the outbreak of the crisis, the basis between CDS and bonds has 
become persistently negative. Because of the funding liquidity shortage and the increased counterparty 
risk in the financial sector trading on the negative basis trade is difficult to implement in practice. Hence 
                                                      
15 The perspective taken by the basis measure is exactly the opposite of that taken in the calculation of the ‘non-default 
component’ in credit spreads (Longstaff et al., 2005), which subtracts the CDS from the bond spread. See also Blanco et al. 
(2005). 
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during periods of distress CDS spreads and bond spreads can depart from their arbitrage-free values due 
to the liquidity and CDS counterparty risk faced by financial intermediaries and investors.  
2.4 Time series of the basis measure 
With the dramatic repricing of risk from September 2008 on, credit markets came under severe stress, 
which was reflected in both high levels and high volatility of the basis. Chart 5 plots the basis estimate. 
As already discussed in the context of chart 3, for seven out of ten countries the basis is positive, i.e. the 
CDS spread always exceeds the bond spread. Here, the mechanism of “flight to liquidity” might have 
played a role in driving down bond spreads. Simultaneously, however concerns about fiscal expansion 
drove CDS spreads up. The overall effect then was a positive spike in the basis. For such a situation, 
arbitrage is difficult to implement as it requires short-selling the bond and selling CDS protection. Given 
that liquidity in government bonds and market functioning are very heterogeneous, this positive basis 
therefore is rather costly to trade on (see also Barclays Capital, 2010b).  
In contrast, the basis for Ireland, Greece and Portugal differs from the other seven countries as there are 
some negative observations. A negative basis arises when the spread on the government bond is higher 
than the CDS spread. Such a difference could in theory be arbitraged away by buying the bond and 
simultaneously buying protection in the CDS market. However, this strategy requires funding for the 
bond position. Hence, in periods of market turbulence, traders may be unable or unwilling to enter such a 
position. In particular, due to the price volatility, haircuts for the position are quite volatile and may be 
sizable. 
16 
Chart 5 also shows the impact of the increased concerns about the fiscal situation of a number of euro 
area countries on the basis. Furthermore, the charts and the table show the high volatility in the basis with 
sharp swings materialising in particular from April 2010 on. This volatility implies that the risk-return 
relation of the basis arbitrage trade was also not constant. The charts provide further evidence of a 
structural break as the basis was relatively constant around 20 to 30 BP during the first part of the sample. 
Parts of this deviation could be also related to ‘cheapest to deliver’ options in the CDS contract (cf. JP 
Morgan, 2009) as well as to measurement issues for the risk-free rate and the impact of the mismatch in 
exchange rates between CDS in USD and euro-denominated bonds. 
Comparing corporates to sovereigns indicates that the relationship between bonds and CDS to some 
extent depends on the type of the underlying debt. Corporate debt typically has a negative basis, which is 
strongly mean-reverting (cf. Fontana, 2010 or Bharot and Guo, 2010). In contrast, we have documented 
that Euro area sovereigns with the temporary exception of Ireland, Greece and Portugal have a positive 
basis.  
                                                      
16 Gorton and Metrick (2009) argue that due their importance in repo market haircuts are a central mechanism of the financial 
crisis. 
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2.5 Factor analysis of the sample 
We apply factor analysis to evaluate the extent of common variation across CDS, bond spreads and the 
basis. Table 4a shows the proportion of the total variance explained by the first factor respectively for 
weekly changes in CDS, weekly changes in bond spreads, and weekly changes in the basis. The sample 
periods are 2 January 2006 to 12 September 2008 (“period I) and 15 September 2008 to 28 June 2010 
(“period II”).  
Comparing the results across assets, we find that the strongest common factors are present in changes in 
CDS and bond spreads. In these two categories, the proportion of the total variance explained by factor 1 
exceeds 80%. Overall, after September 2008, the analysis indicates the presence of significant common 
components for all categories of series as the weight of the first factor is always higher than 60%. The 
table also illustrates the structural break in both CDS and the basis where the increase in the role of the 
common factor grows strongly from period I to period II. In contrast, the weight of the common factor in 
the first differences of bond spreads declines after the collapse of Lehman in September 2008.  
Overall, factor analysis shows that a common factor plays a large role in the variation in sovereign CDS 
spreads and credit spreads. The existence of such a strong common determinant in Euro area sovereign 
debt markets is a stylised fact in the empirical literature. As Sgherri and Zoli (2009, P.10) write “… 
unanimous consensus in the literature that euro area government bond spreads are mostly driven by a 
single time-varying common factor, associated with shifts in international risk appetite.” 
3. Econometric analysis 
3.1 Regression Methodology 
As the previous discussion has shown, fundamentals as well as changes in risk appetite with regard to 
sovereign risk may be among the underlying drivers of the variation of CDS spreads as well as spreads on 
government bonds. In the literature on credit spreads, researchers commonly use as a theoretical 
framework the structural model introduced by Merton (1974), which is oriented towards the analysis of 
corporate credit risk.
17 Gapen et al. (2005) extend this structural modelling approach towards sovereign 
credit risk, thereby providing a contingent-claims based valuation of default risky government bonds. 
Specifically, Gapen et al. (2005) argue that key drivers of the risk of sovereign default are the volatility of 
sovereign assets and a country’s leverage. Hence, many of the theoretical results which are relevant for 
corporate credit risk are indeed also applicable to sovereign credit risk.  
Our main aim is to investigate whether the same set of factors is priced in CDS spreads as well as in bond 
spreads. We start with a set of explanatory variables which comprises proxies for credit risk and for the 
movement of the risk-free rate. Furthermore, we include some factors, which previous research has found 
to be significant determinants of credit spreads (see e.g. Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001, Campbell and 
Taksler, 2003, Raunig and Scheicher, 2009 or Ericsson et al., 2009). In section 3.3 we then extend this set 
                                                      
17 Capuano et al. (2009) discuss recent advances and challenges in credit risk modelling. 
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of variables. We will also build on this set of variables to study the determinants of the basis in section 
3.4. 
x Risk-free rate 
According to the Merton (1974) model changes in the risk free rate in general are negatively related to 
credit spreads. A rising risk-free rate decreases the present value of the expected future cash flows, i.e. the 
price of the put option decreases. Furthermore, a rising risk-free rate tends to raise the expected growth 
rate of the firm value and hence a higher firm value becomes more likely. In turn, this implies a lower 
price of the put option on the firm value. Hence, these two effects should lower the credit spread. As a 
Euro-wide homogeneous proxy we use the Euribor three-month short rate.  
x Risk appetite (RA) 
As already discussed in the previous section credit spreads not only compensate investors for pure 
expected loss (see also Hull et al., 2005). Hence, spreads may change due to changes in investors’ risk 
aversion even if the underlying fundamentals (i.e. the pricing under the “statistical measure”) are 
unchanged. We use the VIX index of implied S&P 500 volatility. In order to calculate a proxy for risk 
appetite, we deduct a GARCH-based estimate of volatility from the VIX index. This estimate represents 
the risk premium which investors in equity options require in order to compensate them for equity market 
risk. 
x Corporate CDS premium (iTraxx) 
Given that credit spreads compensate investors for more than pure expected loss we include a measure of 
aggregate credit market developments, namely the iTraxx Main Investment Grade index. The premium on 
this CDS index should also contain a proxy for investors’ overall appetite for credit risk.  
x Proxy for a country’s public debt (Debt) 
In structural models of sovereign credit risk (Gapen et al., 2005) a firm’s leverage defined as the ratio of 
debt to its assets is a major risk factor. This risk factor is also acknowledged in a fiscal policy perspective 
as the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact aims to cap a country’s total debt at 60 % of its GDP. As a proxy 
we use a country’s total outstanding bonds relative to its GDP. This choice of variable is motivated by 
data availability as the amount of bonds outstanding is available in Bloomberg on a monthly frequency.
18 
We expect that higher debt increases changes in CDS spreads. For bonds, in a market with elastic demand 
this variable also reflects bond market liquidity because a larger bond market generally contributes to 
lower transaction costs. However, if overall supply of new issuance exceeds existing demand, then there 
could also be an adverse impact on bond market liquidity. We expect the second effect to be primarily 
relevant for bond spreads.  
x Idiosyncratic equity volatility (VOL) 
In the structural credit risk model of Gapen et al. (2005) the volatility of sovereign assets is a major factor 
in determining a country’s default risk. Campbell and Taksler (2003) find that the variation in US 
                                                      
18 We use linear interpolation to obtain weekly observations. 
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corporate spreads is more strongly linked to idiosyncratic stock price volatility than to aggregate stock 
price volatility. Following this result we use the idiosyncratic volatility which we calculate as the 
annualised GARCH (1, 1)-volatility of idiosyncratic stock returns (defined as a country’s stock returns 
minus Datastream euro are stock index). We expect that higher volatility raises spread changes.  
x Bid–ask spread (Bid_Ask) 
Tang and Yan (2007) show that the bid–ask spread is significantly positively related to CDS spreads. As 
there are no reliable data on issuer-specific sovereign CDS market liquidity we include the bid-ask spread 
of the iTraxx Main Investment Grade index. This variable should reflect common patterns in the CDS 
market liquidity.  
As chart 3 has indicated, there is substantial heterogeneity in our sample both across time but also across 
countries. In order to deal with the first characteristic we estimate separate regressions for the two sub-
samples which we also used for the descriptive statistics in section 2. For the second type of 
heterogeneity, we create a dummy (“D”) for the group of countries where the market perceives public 
finances to be comparatively weak (cf. e.g. Buiter, 2010): Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
Furthermore, we differentiate between CDS spreads and bond spreads by using separate regressions. Our 
baseline specification is therefore given by 
' Yit = C + E0 VOLit +E1 ' Debtit + E2 ' Risk-free ratet + E3 'RA t + E4' iTraxx t  + E5 ' Bid_Askit +M0 D 
VOLit +M1 D ' Debtit + M2 ' Risk-free ratet + M3 'RA t + M4' iTraxxt  + M5 ' Bid_Askit +Hit (1) 
with Yit a vector of dimension ten representing the spread of the CDS or the bond of country i at time t. 
Table 5 and chart 6 summarise the explanatory variables and the corresponding signs that we expect for 
the respective estimates of the parameters. The effects of the factors are evaluated by means of a standard 
panel regression approach using the change in the CDS spreads or bond spreads as the dependent variable 
and also incorporating country fixed effects. The regression system is estimated with robust standard 
errors. We will use a similar methodology for our analysis of the basis. 
3.2 Overall results for spread changes 
We estimate the baseline regression as given in equation (1) for the two sample periods, 1 January 2006 
to 12 September 2008 (‘period I’) and 15 September 2008 and 28 June 2010 (‘period II’). From the panel 
regression analysis shown in Table 6a and Table 6b, several results are notable.  
x We find some differences between the determinants of CDS spreads and bond spreads. Although 
both markets show a strong linkage to the iTraxx index, the relation is stronger for CDS than for 
bonds. Hence, credit market developments are a significant factor in the variation of Euro area 
sovereign spreads. In particular, the iTraxx corporate index is significant with a positive sign in 
both subperiods. Given that the iTraxx index is also a CDS spread, it seems plausible that this 
variable also picks up other CDS-market related information. More generally, a similar finding 
has been obtained by Haugh et al. (2009) who show that the spread on US high yield corporate 
bonds is an important explanatory variable for the spreads on euro government bonds. 
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x Since September 2008 the sovereign bond market prices country – specific factors. In the second 
subperiod, bond spreads are significantly positively linked to changes in a country’s ratio of 
bonds outstanding over GDP whereas this is not the case for CDS spreads.  
x The dummy D for the subgroup of countries has a significant impact. Among the interaction 
effects, the credit market as represented by the iTraxx index plays the largest role. In particular, 
the effect is positive and highly significant, indicating that CDS spreads and bond spreads of 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain react even stronger to market-wide developments. 
x Global risk aversion is a significant determinant. The difference between US implied and 
historical volatility has a weakly positive effect only on the countries captured by the interaction 
dummy. 
x Although the R squared for the second period by far exceeds the value for the first period, it 
nevertheless indicates a sizable unobserved component in CDS spreads which accounts for more 
than 75 % of the variation of CDS spreads. 
Overall credit market information is a major factor in market pricing whereas equity-market volatility and 
debt measures do not play an important role. Furthermore, we find that CDS spreads of the dummy 
subgroup of countries are linked to a proxy for global risk appetite. The regressions also confirm that 
before the crisis, market prices were less strongly linked to fundamental determinants or global 
information.  
Finally, we perform a factor analysis of the regression residuals. As Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) show, 
residuals of corporate credit spreads still show a significant co-movement despite the fact that the 
regression specification has captured a wide variety of determinants. Table 4b allows us to compare the 
strength of the common factor across the different markets. Overall, the weight increases from period 1 to 
period 2. We find that the first principal component exceeds 40 % in both sub-periods for all residuals. 
3.3 Further results for spread changes 
In order to extend our benchmark regression described above we analyse a number of additional 
determinants.  
x Idiosyncratic equity returns (R) 
Following Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) we use stock returns as a proxy for the overall state of a country’s 
economy. For the purpose of a clearer identification, we use a country’s idiosyncratic stock returns rather 
than its total returns. We define a country’s idiosyncratic stock returns as the difference between its stock 
returns and the market-wide stock return as represented by the Datastream euro area stock index. All 
returns are calculated as first differences of log index values. Our hypothesis is that a positive country-
specific equity return leads to a decrease in the country’s spreads.  
x EONIA (EONIA) 
As an alternative measure of the short rate we use the EONIA rate, which is the overnight rate for 
unsecured interbank borrowing in the euro area. 
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x Implied volatility index (VIX) 
In the extended specification we use the VIX rather than the iTraxx and the risk aversion estimate 
extracted from the VIX, as the VIX itself was shown to be a significant determinant of sovereign credit 
risk by Pan and Singleton (2007) 
x Slope of the term structure (SLOPE) 
In the Longstaff and Schwarz (1995) structural credit risk model with stochastic interest rates, a rising 
slope of the term structure lowers credit spreads. In this model, in the long run, the short rate converges to 
the long rate. Hence an increasing slope of the term structure should lead to an increase in the expected 
future spot rate. This in turn, will decrease credit spreads through its effect on the drift of the asset value 
process, assuming that there are no significant term premia. We assume that a similar effect may hold for 
sovereign spreads and define the slope of the term structure as the difference between the ten-year euro 
swap rate and the three-month Euribor rate.  
x Exchange rate uncertainty (USDVOL) 
Given that we use US$-denominated contracts, variation in the Euro-US$ rate may also influence the 
variation in CDS spreads. In particular, higher uncertainty about future variation of the Euro-US$ rate 
may also have an impact on CDS spreads. For this purpose, we use the implied exchange rate volatility as 
a control variable. Our data source is the EVZ volatility index provided by CBOE. This index follows the 
approach for the VIX index. We expect the implied exchange rate volatility to have a positive effect on 
CDS spreads as higher uncertainty about the future path of the exchange rate should make protection 
more costly.  
Our extended panel specification is therefore given by 
' Yit = C +E0 Rit +E1 ' VOLAit +E2 ' DEBTit + E3 ' VIX t  + E4 ' Eoniat + E5' Slopet + E6 ' USDVOL t 
+ M0 D Rit +M1 D ' VOLAit +M2 D ' LEVERAGEit + M3 D ' VIX t  + M4 D ' Eoniat + M5 D ' Slopet + M6 D 
' USDVOL t + Hit  (2) 
Results for this specification are given in table 7. We concentrate on the second subperiod as the previous 
analysis has shown that in the first period, market pricing was less strongly related to fundamentals. 
Overall, replacing iTraxx and risk aversion by the VIX leads to more or less unchanged estimates 
compared to the base-case model. Among the three additional variables, the EONIA rate and the 
idiosyncratic returns are not significant, but the slope has a significantly negative impact on CDS and 
bond spread changes with the size of the coefficient being almost identical. The implied exchange rate 
volatility has an effect only when interacted with the country subgroup representing Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain. Hence, only the CDS spreads of the subgroup of countries are significantly linked to 
exchange rate variation. 
As an alternative measure for market liquidity we evaluate the explanatory value of the proxies based on 
the number of unchanged price quotations (see also section 2.2 and chart 4). The results (omitted for 
reasons of space) show that both sets of variables do not have a significant effect in the regression 
analysis. 
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3.4 Lead-lag analysis of bond spreads and CDS   
We focus on the lead-lag relationship in order to measure the adjustment process between CDS and bond 
spreads. Hence, we can analyse whether the derivative market or the cash market leads in the pricing 
process. Given the shift in the behaviour of CDS spreads and bond spreads after Lehman’s default we 
split the sample again into two periods. In order to obtain a better overview of pricing dynamics we 
analyse daily rather than weekly CDS and bond spreads. 
As a first step, we verify the unit-root non-stationarity of the CDS and bond spread series
19. The existence 
of a cointegration relationship between the levels of two I(1) variables means that a linear combination of 
these variables is stationary. Cointegrated variables move together in the long run, but may deviate from 
each other in the short run, which means they follow an adjustment process towards equilibrium. A model 
that considers this adjustment process is the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM)
20. 
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Equation (3a) and (3b) express the short term dynamics of CDS and bond spread changes. 
21 Zt-1 is the 
error correction term given by the long run equation (3c) that describes deviations of CDS and bond 
spreads from their approximate no-arbitrage relation. 
If the cash bond market is contributing significantly to price discovery, then Ȝ1 will be negative and 
statistically significant as the CDS market adjusts to incorporate this information. Similarly, if the CDS 
market has an important role in price discovery, then Ȝ2 will be positive and statistically significant
22. If 
both coefficients are significant, then both markets contribute to price discovery. The existence of 
cointegration between CDS and bond spreads implies that at least one market has to contribute to price 
discovery and the other has to adjust
23.  
                                                      
19 We apply the augmented Dickey-Fuller test to each of the 10 Sovereign CDS and bond spread series, independently. We do not 
report results for brevity. As expected, the test does not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for all series in their levels, 
but it does for all series in their first differences, i.e. all series are integrated once, I(1). 
20  Cointegration analysis is carried out in the framework proposed by Johansen (1988, 1991). This test is essentially a 
multivariate Dickey-Fuller test that determines the number of cointegrating equations, or cointagrating rank, by calculating the 
likelihood ratio statistics for each added cointegration equation in a sequence of nested models. 
21 We specify the model with the optimal number of lags for each cointegrating relation.
 
22 The idea is that if the error term of the equilibrium long-run regression is predicting changes in CDS, in the short run 
regression, it means that bond prices move generally first; if the error is positive the CDS is above its value implied by the 
equilibrium relation and it has to adjust downward, i.e  Ȝ1 is negative. Instead, if the error term of the equilibrium long-run 
regression is predicting changes in bond spreads it means that CDS move generally first; if the error is positive the bond 
spread is below its value implied by the equilibrium relation and it has to adjust upward, i.e. Ȝ2 is negative.  
23 This relation is an implication of the Granger representation theorem (Engle and Granger 1987). 
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We proceed as follows. We test for cointegration between the CDS and spread bond for each single 
country. Where we find cointegration we study the lead-lag dynamics by means of the bivariate VECM 
and we analyse the statistical and economic significance of the coefficients Ȝ1 and Ȝ2. This approach 
attributes superior price discovery to the market that adjusts least to price movements in the other market. 
Results are shown in table 8. 
24 
x Before the crisis 
From the cointegration analysis performed on each country, we find that CDS and bond spreads are not 
cointegrated. We apply the Granger causality test on CDS and bond spread changes, but again no lead-lag 
relation is detected. Finally, correlation analysis does not indicate econometric evidence of a relationship 
for most of the countries. 
For this result, one potential explanation is that the parity between CDS and bond spreads approximately 
holds in the sense that the size of the basis is similar for the two groups of countries. However, probably 
in part due to low trading activity in the CDS market before the crisis CDS spreads are relatively constant 
(cf. table 1 and chart 3). Arbitrage forces do not come into play, i.e. CDS and bond spreads move in an 
unrelated manner because they do not move outside the arbitrage bounds determined by transaction costs. 
x Since September 2008 
As shown by the trace test statistics for CDS and bond spreads, all country pairs are cointegrated in the 
second part of our sample. For Germany, France, the Netherlands, Austria and Belgium Ȝ1 is statistically 
significant and has a negative sign, while Ȝ2 is not significant, meaning price discovery takes place into 
the cash market. The Ȝ1 coefficient for Germany, the Netherlands and Austria is quite substantial and is 
approximately - 0.2; for France and Belgium it is smaller, namely - 0.005. For Italy, Ireland, Spain, 
Portugal and Greece Ȝ1 is not significant and Ȝ2 is significant and positive, implying that the derivatives 
market is leading in price discovery and the cash market adjusts. The Ȝ2 coefficients for Italy and Ireland 
are approximately 0.02, while for Spain, Portugal and Greece they are slightly larger, on average 0.5. 
Overall our results illustrate that the market for sovereign CDS was very quiet before the peak of the 
crisis in fall 2008. Since the start of the crisis, with a dramatic re-pricing of risk, for Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, Austria and Belgium the cash market has a predominant role in price discovery. In the case 
of Italy, Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal CDS markets are playing a major role in terms of price 
discovery. Price discovery occurs in the market where informed investors trade at most. CDS are 
unfunded instruments so they are the cheapest way to trade credit risk. Because of their synthetic nature 
they do not suffer from the short-sales constraints in the cash market, and buying (or selling) relatively 
large quantities of credit risk is less difficult (Blanco et. al 2005). However, this price discovery process 
                                                      






. If the 
CDS market dominates the Granger-Gonzalo measure will be close to 1 while if the bond market dominates price discovery 
then the measure will be closer to zero. 
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does not necessarily give rise to systematically profitable opportunities. We evaluate the size of these 
potential arbitrage opportunities in the next section. 
3.5 Regression analysis of the basis 
As shown in chart 5, the basis has deviated from the long run average of about 30 bps since the onset of 
the crisis in August 2007 and it has increased dramatically after the Lehman collapse in September 2008. 
This raises the question to what extent market frictions and risk factors influence basis trading which 
ought to make the no-arbitrage relation between CDS and bonds hold. One explanation for the persistent 
non-zero basis is that CDS, which are derivatives contracts, and bonds, which are cash instruments, are 
exposed to different risk factors. In principle, taking credit risk by purchasing a corporate bond or by 
shorting a CDS on the reference entity is equivalent. However, from a trader’s perspective bonds and 
CDS are not perfect substitutes: Bond prices are affected by interest rate risk, default risk, funding risk 
and market liquidity risk, whereas CDS spreads are affected, mostly, by default risk and counterparty risk.  
When the basis is positive government bonds are more expensive than CDS (i.e. bond spreads are lower 
than CDS). Arbitrageurs may profit from this situation by implementing a positive basis trade, short-
selling the bond, and writing CDS protection. However, in practice it might be costly to obtain the bond 
via a repo transaction in order to short-sell it. At the same time, a situation in which repo rates are very 
low and highly rated bonds might be difficult to obtain in order to short-sell makes it costly for protection 
writers to hedge their positions. 
During stress periods for government bonds, which are usually perceived as safe assets, liquidity might 
play a major role in driving prices up, hence yield spreads would decline through ‘flight to liquidity‘ 
effects. In contrast, deteriorating market liquidity might contribute to increasing the yields of those 
government bonds which are perceived to face non-negligible default risk. Hence, the dynamics of the 
sovereign CDS-bond basis may have shifted during the crisis due to ‘flight to liquidity’ effects which 
have had a heterogeneous impact on euro area countries. Counterparty risk might also affect the basis 
dynamics as the CDS spread is affected by the creditworthiness of protection providers, i.e. major banks. 
Once risk in the inter-bank sector increases default protection is perceived as less valuable. 
Given that we use US$-denominated CDS contracts, variation in the Euro-US$ rate may also influence 
the variation in CDS spreads. It seems plausible that the implied exchange rate volatility has a positive 
effect on CDS spreads as higher uncertainty about the future path of the exchange rate should make 
protection more costly. Since the protection buyer, in case of the default of the underlying, is 
compensated in US$, the value of protection in US$ would have a higher value if the Euro is expected to 
depreciate. 
Overall, we adapt the set of variables from the previous subsections to the analysis of the basis. These 
variables and their expected signs are summarised in Table 9. The Euribor-Eurepo three-month spread is 
expected to have a positive impact on the basis. When the repo rate is lower that the Euribor, it is costly to 
implement a positive basis trade which implies short-selling the underlying bond obtained via repurchase 
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25 and selling protection. The risk aversion estimate extracted from the VIX (RA) is expected to 
have a positive impact on the basis, since CDS are more volatile and sensitive to shifts in risk appetite.  
The uncertainty in the Euro-US$ exchange rate may influence the basis, since it is an additional source of 
risk for the dealer providing protection on a European entity in US$. For this purpose, we again use the 
implied exchange rate volatility USD_VOL as a control variable. We expect the implied exchange rate 
volatility to have a positive effect on CDS spreads as higher uncertainty about the future path of the 
exchange rate should make protection more costly.  
The iTraxx Financials CDS index is expected to have a negative impact on the basis. This variable 
captures the CDS market’s assessment of major European financial institutions. Since major banks are 
protection providers the index premium at least partly represents counterparty risk implicit in sovereign 
CDS contracts. In this sense CDS are expected to have a discount with respect to the bond spread when 
the likelihood of the protection seller’s default is non-negligible.  
As discussed before, the ratio of the amount of bonds outstanding to GDP (Debt) represents a measure of 
leverage, hence it captures the fiscal fundamentals, but it also potentially captures bond market liquidity 
effects. Depending on the market environment, this variable can play different roles in the explanation of 
the basis. On the one hand, in a market with elastic demand this variable generally reflects bond market 
liquidity as a larger bond market generally contributes to lower transaction acts. On the other hand, if the 
overall supply of newly issued bonds exceeds existing demand, then there could also be an adverse 
impact on market liquidity, leading to an increase in the liquidity premium of bond spreads. We again use 
the idiosyncratic equity volatility (Vol) as a second measure of country fundamentals. An increase in 
idiosyncratic equity volatility captures a deterioration of country specific credit risk and is expected to 
have a positive impact both on CDS and bond spreads, so the impact on the basis is ambiguous. 
We estimate the regression as given below again for the two sample subperiods: 
Basisit = C +E0  Bas is it-1 + E1 (Euribor-Eurepo)t + E2 RAt + E3 log(USD_VOL) t  + E4log( iTraxx 
Financials)t + E5 log(Debt) it + E6 log(Vol) it + M1 D*(Euribor-Eurepo) t + M2 D* RAt + M3 D * 
log(USD_VOL) t  +M4 D* log(Itraxx Financials)t +M5 D *log(Debt) it +M6D *log(Vol) it + Hit        (4)  
From the results in Table 10, two main points emerge. First, more factors are significant in the second 
period than in the first period as it has also been the case to some extent for the CDS and bond spread 
changes. Second, the dummy D for the subgroup of countries has a significant impact in the case of an 
aggregate proxy (iTraxx Financials) and a country specific variable (total debt). 
In addition we note the following results. 
x The basis is mean reverting. Deviations between CDS and bond spreads tend to decline. The 
coefficient on the lagged basis is approximately 0.85 before and 0.73 during the crisis.  
                                                      
25 The cost of a positive basis trade is the difference between the repo rate gained on the repo transaction and the Libor rate which 
has to be paid on the shorted bond. 
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x In the crisis sub-period, the Euribor-Eurepo spread rate has a positive (14.65) and significant 
impact on the basis. This spread measures the cost of shorting a bond in a positive basis arbitrage 
trade; this effect is homogeneous across all countries. 
x Proxies for aggregate risk appetite are a significant factor in the variation of the basis. In 
particular, the S&P 500 risk aversion is significant with a positive (0.23) coefficient during the 
crisis. Hence, an increase in US equity risk aversion raises the basis which is at least partly 
related to the significant effect of the S&P 500 risk aversion on CDS spreads observed in section 
3.2. This finding is in contrast to results for the corporate basis (Fontana, 2010). 
x In contrast to our hypothesis, the uncertainty in the Euro-US$ exchange rate does not have a 
significant impact on the basis dynamics. 
x Idiosyncratic equity volatility is significantly negatively related (-6.87) to the dynamic of the 
basis. This might be due the fact that the positive impact on bond spreads is stronger than on CDS 
spreads, as the analysis of spreads in section 3.2 has shown. 
x The group of countries’ bases without the dummy is not sensitive to the iTraxx Financials level 
dynamics while for countries captured by the dummy this linkage is negative (-16.81). This 
highlights the heterogeneity among countries in terms of CDS counterparty risk effects. 
Protection on countries in the first group is perceived to be less risky while for the countries in 
the dummy group the CDS premium is linked to creditworthiness of protection providers. Hence, 
an increasing risk assessment of major financial institutions makes CDS protection less valuable. 
A decrease of the CDS premium relative to the bond spread then implies a reduction of the basis. 
x Before the crisis the impact of debt is negative and small (-7.17) for all countries, while during 
the crisis there is a crossectional difference in the impact of total debt. The basis of Germany, 
France, Netherlands, Belgium and Austria is positively related to the amount outstanding of 
bonds divided by GDP (coefficient of 51.93). Our analysis cannot explain the direction of the 
causality, since it seems plausible that bond issuance patterns are related to the level of the 
interest rates in order to optimise sovereign debt costs and to raise funds for state aid measures. In 
contrast, for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain which on average have lower bases, the 
interaction dummy indicates an overall negative impact of the amount of bonds outstanding (total 
coefficient of -12.48 = 51.93 – 64.41). As shown in the time series of the debt variable in chart 6, 
governments have issued substantial amounts of debt in the period following the Lehman collapse 
and the subsequent recovery in March 2009. Larger amounts of outstanding bonds may have 
deteriorated bond liquidity, driving bond spreads up beyond CDS spreads, hence the basis has 
become smaller and in some cases negative. 
x The adjusted R squared for the first and second period are respectively 0.95 and 0.75. 
In sum, we find that during the crisis period the sovereign bases are mean reverting and significantly 
linked to the cost of short-selling bonds, to proxies for global risk appetite and to country-specific factors. 
We also find crossectional differences in the effect of counterparty risk and debt outstanding.  
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3.6 Further results for the regression analysis of the basis 
In order to extend our benchmark regression described above we use a number of additional determinants.  
x Stock market trading volume (equity volume) 
This variable captures country specific stock market liquidity conditions, which are expected to be 
correlated with country specific bond market liquidity and hence also with the basis. One reason for using 
this indirect proxy is that the segmentation of trading across a number of fixed income platforms means 
that there is no reliable information on market turnover. For each country we use data for trading volumes 
on a major stock index (e.g. for Germany we use the DAX or for Italy the FTSE MIB). A decrease in 
equity trading volume captures the deterioration of country specific market liquidity and is expected to 
drive bond spreads larger than CDS spreads. As the mean of the basis is positive, the relation between the 
basis and stock market volume is expected to be negative.  
x Outstanding stock of U.S. dollar financial commercial paper (CP fin outstd) 
Given that financial institutions use a substantial amount of short-term borrowing to fund their trading 
operations, this variable measures the availability of market-based funding for trading operations, (see 
also Adrian, Etula and Shin, 2010). Due to the lack of comparable data for Europe we use data from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. If the volume of CP increases, we would expect the basis to decline 
towards zero as the funding allows for increased arbitrage operations. 
x Volume of term repurchase agreements (Term Repo Outst) 
The volume of term repos is an alternative measure of potential leverage constraints for major financial 
institutions. This variable represents repo transactions for the New York Federal Reserve’s primary 
dealers. The typical horizon of these operations is overnight, but the Fed can also conduct these 
operations with terms out to 65 business days. Term-repo volume is not only a measure of market based 
funding availability, but it might also reflect the difficulty for arbitrageurs to find government bonds to 
short-sell in order to profit from the positive basis.  
We estimate the regression as given below again for the two sample subperiods: 
Basisit = C +E0  Bas is it-1 + E1 (Euribor-Eurepo)t + E2 RAt + E3 log(USD_VOL) t  + E4log( iTraxx 
Financials)t + E5 log(Debt) it +E6 log(Vol) t +E7 log(Cp Fin Outst) t  +E8 log(Term Repo Outst) t +E9 
log(Equity Volume) t + M1 D*(Euribor-Eurepo) t + M2 D* RAt + M3 D * log(USD_VOL) t  + M4  D* 
log(Itraxx Financials)t +M5 D *log(Debt) it +M6D *log(Vol) it +M7D *log(Cp Fin Outst) t +M8D *log(Term 
Repo Outst) t +M9D *log(Equity Volume) t + Hit            (5)  
The introduction of these new variables does not materially affect the coefficients and the significance of 
the variables from the baseline model. Results of the regression analysis are shown in Table 11. Before 
the crisis the basis is significantly and positively related to the commercial paper outstanding (13.36). 
When U.S. dollar funding liquidity is high, the risk appetite of dollar-funded intermediaries is high and 
their required compensation for holding risky assets is low. In such a situation bond spreads are narrow 
and the basis is positive. During the crisis, for the dummy group country, the basis is negatively related to 
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the commercial paper outstanding (-21.81). This indicates that when funding liquidity started to 
deteriorate the basis in general has not been affected, but for the dummy country group it widened. 
Furthermore, during the crisis, for the dummy group of countries, the basis is positively related to term-
repo (15.52).
26 Finally, the stock market volume does not affect the basis. Hence, it might be the case that 
stock market liquidity conditions are already captured by other variables in the regressions, such as the 
country specific idiosyncratic equity volatility. 
Overall, our analysis in this subsection shows that variables which provide a measure of the availability of 
market-based funding affect the sovereign basis dynamics. Results are in line with the idea that financial 
institutions use a substantial amount of short-term borrowing to fund their trading operations and that this 
structural feature then directly affects market pricing (see also Adrian, Etula and Shin, 2010). 
4. Conclusions
The crisis has led to a wide-ranging discussion on the costs and benefits of CDS. As robust and 
significant evidence on many of the questions is not yet available, it seems too early to draw definite 
research-based conclusions. Furthermore, a review of these general issues many of which are related to 
US subprime assets is beyond the scope of this paper (Stulz, 2010 offers a comprehensive review of the 
risks and benefits of the CDS market).  
Our first main finding is that the recent repricing of sovereign credit risk seems mostly due to common 
factors. Our regressions for CDS and bond spreads separately and the regression analysis of the basis in 
some respects lead to similar findings, in particular as regards the driving factors of CDS and bond 
spreads and the dynamics of the basis and the evidence for structural breaks since the outbreak of the 
crisis. 
Second we observe that for most countries the CDS spread exceeds the spread on the corresponding 
government bond relative to the swap rate. The exceptions here are Portugal, Ireland and Greece where 
we find a temporary negative basis. Since September 2008, market integration for bonds and CDS differs 
across countries. In half of the sample countries, price discovery takes place in the CDS market and in the 
other half, price discovery is observed in the bond market. In contrast, before the crisis, limited trading 
activity in the sovereign CDS market affected price discovery and the linkages between the bond and the 
derivative market. Since the start of the crisis period the sovereign bases are mean reverting and 
significantly linked to the cost of short-selling bonds, to proxies for global risk appetite and to country-
specific factors. We also find a crossectional difference in the impact of counterparty risk and debt 
issuance. 
Overall, our results provide further supportive evidence for the existence of arbitrage crashes and slow 
moving capital. Deviations from the arbitrage-free parity do not seem to be easily exploitable as market 
frictions and structural changes throughout the crisis inhibit traders to arbitrage away these price 
differentials. Duffie (2010) discusses how asset prices can differ from the arbitrage-free and friction-less 
                                                      
26 We have also tested the overnight repo (short term funding liquidity) variable, but there is no significant effect on the basis. 
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case when there are significant institutional impediments (i.e. ‘slow moving capital’) such that market 
participants can not immediately profit from apparent mispricing. According to Mitchell and Pulvino 
(2010) during the crisis traders could not exploit arbitrage opportunities such as the large negative basis in 
US corporate debt due to restrictions in the availability of capital. Another paper which is closely related 
to our analysis is Fleckenstein et al. (2010) who document that a persistent arbitrage opportunity between 
US Treasuries and TIPS is partly related to supply factors.
27 
The results in this paper support the evidence that there are major commonalities as well as differences 
between corporate and sovereign CDS. On the one hand, both markets have witnessed a substantial 
repricing with a reassessment of the likelihood of tail events. The repricing of public debt seems to be 
driven by strong common factors as well as by country-specific effects. Risk premia play an important 
role in the spike in both types of CDS spreads. On the other hand, there are sizable differences. Besides 
the potential importance of technical default, the mechanism of ‘flight to liquidity’ is a major factor in 
public debt markets. This mechanism is supported e.g. by the mechanics of the Basel II capital 
requirements where the standardised approach treats government debt with a rating above A+ as risk-free. 
Together with the impact of limits to arbitrage, this “flight to liquidity effect” seems to drive a wedge 
between CDS spreads and the prices of the underlying government bonds. Comparing our results for 
sovereigns to those for corporates, we find a significant difference as private-sector debt typically had a 
negative basis (Fontana, 2010) whereas we showed that sovereign debt has a positive basis. This 
essentially implies a liquidity premium in corporates and a liquidity discount in sovereigns.  
                                                      
27 See also Mercurio (2009). Duarte et al. (2007) provide a general discussion of arbitrage in fixed income markets. 
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Chart 4: Liquidity proxies 
The sample period is 1 January 2006 to 28 June 2010. The variable is constructed as the total number of 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of levels of CDS spreads 
The sample periods are 1 January 2006 to 12 September 2008 (“period I) and 15 September  2008 to 28 
June 2010 (“period II”). All statistics are in basis points. 
     Period  I      
 Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std.  Dev.    N 
AUSTRIA 6.75  3.80  19.70  1.90  5.25  141 
BELGIUM  10.80  4.40 34.90  2.90  10.02 141 
FRANCE 6.99  4.40  19.80  1.90  5.05  141 
GERMANY 5.61  3.50  15.00  1.80  3.38  141 
GREECE 30.98  25.00  73.20  11.00  16.94  141 
IRELAND 14.43  10.79  39.80  2.50  12.05  141 
ITALY 27.43  22.70  59.00  11.70  12.49  141 
NETHERLANDS 6.21  3.56  19.30 1.80  4.83 141 
PORTUGAL 21.51  14.60  56.00  7.50  14.19  141 
SPAIN  17.37  7.07 54.20  4.20  16.01 141 
            
            
     Period  II      
   Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.   N 
AUSTRIA 97.15  86.73  255.26  16.90  42.13  94 
BELGIUM 72.08  63.57  148.10  29.50  30.05  94 
FRANCE 49.78  44.60  100.28  16.50  20.10  94 
GERMANY 39.85  36.68  90.70  12.40  14.94  94 
GREECE 251.35  200.89  1018.50  65.80  172.42  94 
IRELAND 180.32  170.07  347.30  40.50  57.91  94 
ITALY 121.39  113.41  234.18  53.20  39.79  94 
NETHERLANDS 53.85  44.93  126.26 15.50  25.65  94 
PORTUGAL 116.76  92.65  355.06  47.05  67.97  94 
SPAIN 112.88  102.60  247.30  50.90  43.21  94 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of government bond spreads 
The sample periods are 1 January 2006 to 12 September  2008 (“period I) and 15 September  2008 to 28 
June 2010 (“period II”). All statistics are in basis points. The reference rate is the 10-year swap rate.
 
     Period  I      
   Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std.  Dev.  N 
AUSTRIA -24.64  -22.06  -15.57  -42.14  5.84  141 
BELGIUM -19.61  -19.89  -7.38  -29.10  4.58  141 
FRANCE -25.64  -23.56  -13.35  -46.79  6.87  141 
GERMANY -32.33  -26.73  -13.99  -60.47  11.57  141 
GREECE 1.33  2.20  20.16  -13.79  8.25  141 
IRELAND -26.02  -26.53  -11.55  -43.27  5.91  141 
ITALY -2.42  -1.90  12.11  -17.97  7.65  141 
NETHERLANDS -25.72  -23.96  -15.31 -44.32  5.77  141 
PORTUGAL -11.45  -11.61  -2.65  -21.67  4.49  141 
SPAIN 28.82  20.07  -11.38  -34.22  5.24  141 
            
     Period  II       
 Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std.  Dev.  N 
AUSTRIA 22.18  17.85  90.44  -54.60  30.13  94 
BELGIUM 24.98  21.15  82.61  -32.72  21.29  94 
FRANCE -1.51  3.21  28.22  -52.28  18.12  94 
GERMANY -35.61  -27.07  -9.74  -83.41  18.88  94 
GREECE 156.86  148.36  362.92  4.12  71.84  94 
IRELAND 120.79  129.03  227.83  -39.76  61.27  94 
ITALY 59.48  57.04  115.44  -2.05  22.44  94 
NETHERLANDS 4.23  4.40  36.40  -53.46 18.82 94 
PORTUGAL 53.99  46.28  139.12  -20.12  33.56  94 
SPAIN 33.06  34.85  70.29  -27.21  21.89  94 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the basis 
The sample periods are 1 January 2006 to 12 September  2008 (“period I) and 15 September  2008 to 28 
June 2010 (“period II”). The basis is defined as CDS spread minus bond spread (relative to the 10-year 
swap rate). All statistics are in basis points.
 
     Period  I     
   Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std.  Dev.  N 
AUSTRIA 31.39  26.50  61.04  19.37  10.11  141 
BELGIUM 30.41  25.71  56.61  15.60  9.87  141 
FRANCE 32.63  27.97  64.59  17.05  11.18  141 
GERMANY 37.94  30.15  74.67  19.49  14.53  141 
GREECE 29.65  23.58  68.96  13.74  15.16  141 
IRELAND 40.45  40.24  62.66  20.34  10.78  141 
ITALY 29.86  23.51  66.27  15.46  13.78  141 
NETHERLANDS 31.93  27.21  62.32  18.56  9.82  141 
PORTUGAL 32.96  26.76  69.38  16.45  15.19  141 
SPAIN 28.82  20.73  68.88  7.65  17.38  141 
            
            
      Period  II     
 Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std.  Dev.    N 
AUSTRIA 76.58  69.01  172.46  35.93  32.16  94 
BELGIUM 45.49  45.24  92.57  3.20  23.09  94 
FRANCE 49.34  44.51  102.31  11.10  24.09  94 
GERMANY 73.65  64.70  135.16  43.62  25.53  94 
GREECE 30.58  25.32  273.69  -167.03  53.43  94 
IRELAND 47.78  30.96  187.08  -64.24  50.31  94 
ITALY 56.99  57.66  119.46  7.71  28.65  94 
NETHERLANDS 50.53  42.12  115.23  11.13  25.40  94 
PORTUGAL 40.79  46.18  114.03  -27.22  31.99  94 
SPAIN 67.1  69.7  112.8  23.4  23.1  94 
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Table 4a: Factor analysis  
The sample periods are 1 January 2006 to 12 September 2008 (“period I) and 15 September 2008 to 28 
June 2010 (“period II”). 
  Proportion explained by factor 1 (%) 
CDS – period I  72.6 
CDS – period II  84.5 
Bond spreads – period I  80 
Bond spreads – period II  62.4 
Basis – period I  64.8 
Basis – period II  77.9 
Table 4b: Factor analysis  
This table reports the results of a factor analysis on the residuals of the baseline regressions (1) of CDS 
and bond spread changes on the explanatory variables. The sample periods are 1 January 2006 to 12 
September 2008 (“period I) and 15 September 2008 to 28 June 2010 (“period II”). 
  Proportion explained by factor 1 (%) 
Bond residuals – period I   63.2 
Bond residuals – period II  43.4 
CDS residuals – period I   49.5 
CDS residuals – period II  50.1 
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Table 5: Description of explanatory variables and expected signs for parameter estimates 
This table reports the variables used in the regressions where the dependent variable is the change in the 
CDS spread. The data sources are Bloomberg, Datastream and JP Morgan.  
 
Notation Definition  Sign 
Risk-free rate  Euribor 3 M  (-)           
Risk Aversion  VIX index - GARCH volatility  (+) 
iTraxx  ITRAXX 5 Y CDS index  (+) 
Debt  Bonds outstanding / GDP  (+) 
Vol  Idiosyncratic equity volatility  (+) 
Bid_Ask  Bid-Ask spread of iTraxx  (+) 
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Table 6a: Results of baseline regression model 
This table reports the results from regressions of weekly CDS spread changes including country fixed 
effects: ' CDSit = C + E0 ' Risk-free ratet + E1 'Risk Aversion t + E2' iTraxx t  + E3 ' Debtit +E4 VOLit +  
E5 ' Bid_Askit +M0 D Risk-free ratet +M1 D 'Risk Aversion t + M2 ' iTraxxt + M3 ' Debtit + M4' VOLit + M5 
' Bid_Askit +Hit The t-statistics are given adjacent to the coefficient estimates The sample periods are 1 
January 2006 to 12 September 2008 (“period I) and 15 September 2008 to 28 June 2010 (“period II”). 
 
Period I 
Variable Coefficient  t-Statistic 
    
Intercept 0.12  (1.30) 
Risk-free rate  -0.61  (-0.16) 
Risk aversion  -0.01  (-0.59) 
Itraxx 5y  0.05  (3.31)*** 
Debt 8.01  (0.26) 
Vol 0.31  (0.06) 
Bid_ask   7.58  (0.84) 
Dummy Risk-free rate  2.31  (0.46) 
Dummy Risk Aversion  -0.03  (-1.06) 
Dummy Itraxx 5y  0.09  (4.78)*** 
Dummy Debt  17.16  (0.45) 
Dummy Vol  9.42  (1.46) 
Dummy bid-ask  5.38  (0.48) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.13   
 
Period II 
Variable Coefficient  t-Statistic 
    
Intercept 1.94  (1.39) 
Risk-free rate  -2.69  (-0.33) 
Risk aversion  0.03  (0.46) 
Itraxx 5y  0.54  (9.00)*** 
Debt 180.70  (0.92) 
Vol 4.26  (0.36) 
Bid_ask   -78.00  (-0.85) 
Dummy Risk-free rate  8.51  (0.39) 
Dummy Risk Aversion  0.55  (1.60)* 
Dummy Itraxx 5y  0.64  (3.07)*** 
Dummy Debt  -541.76  (-0.94) 
Dummy Vol  -22.63  (-0.75) 
Dummy bid-ask  -407.47  (-1.26) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.25   
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Table 6b: Results of baseline regression model 
This table reports the results from regressions of weekly bond spread changes including country fixed 
effects: ' Bond spreadit = C + E0 ' Risk-free ratet + E1 'Risk Aversion t + E2' iTraxx t  + E3 ' Debtit +E4 
VOLit +  E5 ' Bid_Askit +M0 D Risk-free ratet +M1 D 'Risk Aversion t + M2 ' iTraxxt + M3 ' Debtit + M4' 
VOLit + M5 ' Bid_Askit + Hit  
The t-statistics are given adjacent to the coefficient estimates. The sample periods are 2 January 2006 to 
8 September 2008 (“period I) and 15 September 2008 to 28 June 2010 (“period II”). 
 
Period I 
Variable Coefficient  t-Statistic 
    
Intercept -0.04  (-0.32) 
Risk-free rate  -1.20  (-0.24) 
Risk aversion  0.01  (0.40) 
Itraxx -0.12  (-3.35)*** 
Debt 9.84  (0.14) 
Vol -4.99  (-0.72) 
bid_ask   -0.69  (-0.73) 
Dummy Risk-free rate  3.92  (1.98)** 
Dummy Risk Aversion  -0.02  (-1.18) 
Dummy Itraxx   0.12  (5.64)*** 
Dummy Debt  -2.38  (-0.03) 
Dummy Vol  5.80  (0.65) 
Dummy bid-ask  1.45  (1.09) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.57   
 
Period II 
Variable Coefficient  t-Statistic 
    
Intercept 1.65  (1.32) 
Risk-free rate  -7.28  (-0.64) 
Risk aversion  -0.06  (-0.73) 
Itraxx 0.15  (2.12)** 
Debt 280.88  (1.64)* 
Vol 1.47  (0.14) 
bid_ask   -3.54  (-1.00) 
Dummy Risk-free rate  -5.66  (-0.20) 
Dummy Risk Aversion  0.42  (0.97) 
Dummy Itraxx  0.80  (2.49)** 
Dummy Debt  -860.05  (-1.22) 
Dummy Vol  89.44  (1.59) 
Dummy bid-ask  0.63  (0.05) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.16   
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Table 7: Results of extended regression model 
This table reports the results from panel regressions with country fixed effects specified as follows:  
' Yit = C +E0 Rit +E1 ' VOLit +E2 ' DEBTit + E3 ' VIX t  + E4 ' Eoniat + E5' Slopet + E6 ' USD_VOL t + 
M0 D Rit +M1 D ' VOLit +M2 D ' LEVERAGEit + M3 D ' VIX t  + M4 D ' Eoniat + M5 D ' Slopet + M6 D ' 
USD_VOL t + Hit 
The t-statistics based White standard errors are given adjacent to the coefficient estimates. The sample 
period is 15 September 2008 to 28 June 2010. 
 
 
  'CDS   ' Bond Spread   
  Coeff t-stat  Coeff  t-stat 
        
Intercept 2.38  (1.67)*  1.99  -1.7 
R 34.28  -0.67  32.15  -0.88 
VOL 2.88  -0.22  2.39  -0.27 
DEBT 169.99  -0.73  302.55  (1.88)** 
VIX 0.63  (2.95)***  -0.12  (-0.76) 
EONIA -2.74  (-0.37)  -7.37  (-1.03) 
SLOPE -14.84  (-2.18)**  -14.01  (-2.54)** 
USD_VOL 0.26  -0.68  0.2  -0.39 
Dummy*R -60.82  (-0.67)  70.69  -0.94 
Dummy*VOL -47.97  (-1.53) 63.81 -1.28 
Dummy*DEBT -444.21  (-0.69) -775.24 (-1.06) 
Dummy*VIX 1.11  (2.11)**  1.09  -1.46 
Dummy*EONIA -5.66 (-0.76) -11.98 (-1.41) 
Dummy*SLOPE -17.77  (-1.63)* -10.49 (-0.80) 
Dummy*USD_VOL 1.83  (1.93)**  2.18  -1.49 
R-squared 0.13  0.07  
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Table 8: Lead-lag relationship between CDS and bond spreads 
The lead-lag analysis reported in the tables below is implemented for each single sovereign entity. 
Johansen cointegration test results (p. values of the trace test statistics) are reported in the first line of 
table. Where we find cointegration we study the lead-lag dynamics by mean of the bivariate VECM 




j j t j j t
p
j
j t t BondSpread CDS Z CDS 1 1 1
1





j j t j j t
p
j
j t t BondSpread CDS Z BondSpread 2 1 2
1
2 1 2 ) ( H E D O  '  '    ' ¦ ¦    
 
  
When both Ȝ1 and Ȝ2 are significant the method we use, to investigate the mechanics of price discovery, is 




 . The t- statistics are given 
adjacent to the coefficient estimates. When we do not find cointegration we run the Granger causality test 
on the series in their levels. The sample period is 15 September 2008 to 28 June 2010. 
 
Country      Germany  France  Netherlands  Austria  Belgium  Italy  Ireland  Spain  Portugal  Greece 
Trace test                
    p-v  0.037** 0.082* 0.000*** 0.000***  0.1000* 0.065* 0.098* 0.074*  0.100*  0.069* 
                
lambda 1  -0.019  -0.005  -0.028  -0.022  -0.004  0.014  -0.009  0.008  0.024  0.026 
t-stat  [-3.405]** [-2.682]* [-4.166]*** [-4.696]*** [-2.856]*  [  1.794]  [-0.868]  [  0.599]  [  1.540]  [  1.337] 
                
lambda2 -0.004  -0.004  0.001  0.002  -0.003  0.018  0.019  0.039  0.044  0.066 
t-stat  [-0.483]  [-1.682]  [ 0.211]  [ 0.308]  [-1.934]  [ 3.430]**  [ 2.176]*  [ 3.773]**  [ 3.361]**  [ 3.477]** 
                
P.  discov  Bond  Bond  Bond  Bond  Bond  Cds Cds Cds  Cds  Cds 
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Table 9: Explaining the basis: description of explanatory variables and expected signs for 
parameter estimates 
This table reports the variables used in the regressions with country fixed effects where the dependent 
variable is the basis defined as CDS 10y – (Yield of 10y benchmark bond – 10y swap rate). The first 
group of countries is Germany, France, Netherlands, Austria and Belgium. The dummy variable defines 
the second group of countries given by Italy, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece. The data sources are 
Bloomberg, Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Datastream. 
 
Notation Definition  Sign
Basis (-1)  Lagged basis  (+) 
Euribor-Eurepo  3m Euribor vs. eurepo spread  (+) 
Risk Aversion  S&P 500 risk aversion  (+) 
USD_VOL  Implied volatility of USD/EUR  (+) 
Itraxx Financials   Itraxx Financials 5y CDS index   (+/-) 
Debt Bond  outst/GDP  (+/-) 
Vol  Idiosyncratic equity vol  (+/-)
Equity Volume  Country specific stock index volume   (-) 
Cp Fin Outst  US$ Financial commercial paper outstanding   (-) 
Term-Repo  Outst  Term repurchase agreements outstanding of the Federal Reserve’s primary 
dealers 
(-) 
Dummy  Dummy for group II  (+/-) 
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Table 10: Results of the basis regression: baseline model 
This table reports the results from panel regressions of weekly observations of the basis including country 
fixed effects: 
 Basisit = C +E0  Basisit-1 + E1 (Euribor-Eurepo)t + E2 Risk Aversiont + E3 log(USD_VOL) t  + E4log( 
iTraxx Financials)t + E5 log(Debt) it +E6 log(Vol) it +M1 D*(Euribor-Eurepo) t +M2 D* Risk Aversiont + 
M3 D * log(USD_VOL) t  +M4 D* log(Itraxx Financials)t +M5 D *log(Debt) it +M6D *log(Vol) it + Hit 
The t-statistics is based on White cross-section standard errors are given adjacent to the coefficient 
estimates. Coefficients marked *** are significant at 1 %, ** are significant at 5 % and * are significant 
at 10 %. The sample periods are 2 January 2006 to 12 September 2008 (“period I) and 15 September  
2008 to 28 June 2010 (“period II”). 
Period I 
Variable Coefficient  t-Statistic 
    
Intercept -6.81  (-1.12) 
Basis (t-1)  0.85  (30.45)*** 
Euribor-Eurepo -3.74  (-2.49)** 
Risk Aversion  0.06  (1.10) 
USD_VOL -2.43  (-0.71) 
Itraxx Financials  2.53  (4.32)*** 
Debt -7.17  (2.15)** 
Vol -0.05  (-0.10) 
Dummy Euribor-Eurepo  0.91  (0.82) 
Dummy Risk Aversion  -0.03  (-0.70) 
Dummy USD_VOL  4.02  (1.26) 
Dummy Itraxx Financials  -0.21 (-0.49) 
Dummy Debt  -0.38  (-0.08) 
Dummy Vol  0.34  (0.49) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.95   
Period II 
Variable Coefficient  t-Statistic 
    
Intercept -1.42  (-0.04) 
Basis (t-1)  0.73  (7.80)*** 
Euribor-Eurepo 14.65  (3.63)*** 
Risk Aversion  0.23  (2.25)** 
USD_VOL 7.36  (0.76) 
Itraxx Financials  5.70  (1.04) 
Debt 51.93  (2.84)*** 
Vol -6.87  (-2.53)*** 
Dummy Euribor-Eurepo  -10.22  (-1.41) 
Dummy Risk Aversion  -0.08  (-0.60) 
Dummy USD_VOL  5.30  (0.51) 
Dummy Itraxx Financials  -16.81  (-1.67)* 
Dummy Debt  -64.41  (-3.67)*** 
Dummy Vol  4.91  (1.09) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.75   
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Table 11: Results of the basis regression: extended model 
This table reports the results from panel regressions of weekly observations of the basis including country 
fixed effects:  
Basisit = C +E0  Bas is it-1 + E1 (Euribor-Eurepo)t + E2 RAt + E3 log(USD_VOL) t  + E4log( iTraxx 
Financials)t + E5 log(Debt) it +E6 log(Vol) t +E7 log(Cp Fin Outst) t  +E8 log(Term Repo Outst) t +E9 
log(Equity Volume) t + M1 D*(Euribor-Eurepo) t + M2 D* RAt + M3 D * log(USD_VOL) t  + M4  D* 
log(Itraxx Financials)t +M5 D *log(Debt) it +M6D *log(Vol) it +M7D *log(Cp Fin Outst) t +M8D *log(Term 
Repo Outst) t +M9D *log(Equity Volume) t + Hit 
The t-statistics is based on White cross-section standard errors are given adjacent to the coefficient 
estimates. Coefficients marked *** are significant at 1 %, ** are significant at 5 % and * are significant 
at 10 %. The sample periods are 2 January 2006 to 12 September 2008 (“period I) and 15 September  
2008 to 28 June 2010 (“period II”). 
 
        
                                             Period I                           Period II 
Variable  Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
        
Intercept -181.09  (-4.95)***  24.29  (0.17) 
Basis (t-1)  0.80  (27.90)***  0.71  (7.42)*** 
Euribor-Eurepo -1.81  (-1.41)  14.10  (3.31)*** 
RA  0.05 (0.83) 0.25  (2.40)** 
USD_VOL -2.87  (-0.75)  11.43  (1.18) 
Itraxx  Financials  0.06 (4.32)*** 0.05  (1.18) 
Debt 3.73  (1.05)  24.34  (1.28) 
Vol 0.49  (0.95)  -7.89  (-3.07)*** 
Cp Fin Outst  13.36  (3.65)***  -9.00  (-1.08) 
Term  Repo  Outst  0.29 (0.16) 6.35 (1.11) 
Equity Volume  -0.55  (-1.24)  0.65  (0.52) 
Dummy Euribor-Eurepo  0.04  (0.04)  -9.72  (-1.46) 
Dummy RA  -0.06 (-1.07) -0.06 (-0.43) 
Dummy USD_VOL  3.62  (1.07)  11.95  (1.01) 
Dummy Itraxx Financials  0.00 (-0.14) -0.13  (-1.47) 
Dummy Debt  -7.38  (-1.40)  -60.73  (-2.80)** 
Dummy  Vol  0.35 (0.51) 0.34 (0.09) 
Dummy Cp Fin Outst  0.78  (0.22)  -21.81  (-1.73)* 
Dummy Term Repo Outst  1.50  (0.97)  15.52  (1.73)* 
Dummy Equity Volume  0.32  (0.68)  -2.85  (-0.99) 
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